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ENQUIRE PROJECT DETAILS BY GENERAL PUBLIC |
| Project Details |
| Funding Scheme : | General Research Fund | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project Number : | 17614921 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project Title(English) : | Decentralizing Platform Governance: Innovations from China | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project Title(Chinese) : | 平台治理的去中心化:来自中国的创新 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Principal Investigator(English) : | Dr Zhang, Huyue Angela | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Principal Investigator(Chinese) : | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Department : | Department of Law | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Institution : | The University of Hong Kong | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| E-mail Address : | angelaz@hku.hk | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Tel : | 39174351 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Co - Investigator(s) : |
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| Panel : | Humanities, Social Sciences | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Subject Area : | Social and Behavioural Sciences | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Exercise Year : | 2021 / 22 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Fund Approved : | 656,825 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project Status : | Completed | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Completion Date : | 30-6-2024 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project Objectives : |
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| Abstract as per original application (English/Chinese): |
Our study will investigate the emerging phenomenon of self-governance in the digital economy, which has seen an ever-increasing number of online platforms relegating the authority to make rules and adjudicate disputes to platform participants. Today’s thriving online platforms face complex governance issues, giving them the appearance of sovereignty to a large extent. Platform operators have traditionally adopted a centralized model of governance: they propose transactional rules for participants, apply and enforce those rules, and mediate and adjudicate conflicts when they arise. In recent years, however, many large Chinese online platforms, including Taobao, JD.com, Didi, WeChat, and Zhihu, have quietly initiated experiments to decentralize their law-making and dispute resolution functions. We are interested in exploring these Chinese innovations within platform governance, the driving forces behind the adoption of the new mechanisms, and their associated merits and challenges, together with their legal and economic consequences. We plan to formulate game-theoretical models of the mechanism designs of these innovations and empirically evaluate their effectiveness. We also plan to conduct a comparative study of platform governance in the United States and China to explore how institutional factors can influence the governance of online platforms in different jurisdictions.
Our project represents the first systematic effort to examine the various decentralized governance schemes that Chinese online platforms have introduced. It will contribute to several strands of existing literature, particularly research on platform governance, online dispute resolution, and law and technology. Our findings will offer practical insights for online platforms that desire to improve their governance structures to ease tension and resolve conflicts among their users. The research will also assist policymakers in evaluating the effects of different governance mechanism designs, helping them to make more informed decisions about whether, when, and how to regulate online platforms. We plan to write three articles systematically analyzing the phenomenon and consequences of decentralized platform governance and submit them to leading international peer-reviewed journals.
我们的研究将调查数字经济中新兴的去中心化的治理现象，其中越来越多的在线平台将制定规则和裁决争议的权力下放给平台参与者。如今蓬勃发展的网络平台面临着复杂的治理问题，在很大程度上赋予了它们类似国家主权的权力。平台运营商传统上采用集中式治理模式：他们为参与者提出交易规则，应用和执行这些规则，并在冲突出现时进行调解和裁决。然而，近年来，包括淘宝、京东、滴滴、微信、知乎在内的许多中国大型网络平台，都在悄悄地开展立法和争议解决功能下放的实验。我们有兴趣探索这些中国在平台治理方面的创新、采用新机制背后的驱动力、相关的优点和挑战，以及它们的法律和经济后果。我们计划制定这些创新机制设计的博弈论模型，并根据经验评估其有效性。我们还计划对美国和中国的平台治理进行比较研究，以探索制度因素如何影响不同司法管辖区的在线平台治理。 |
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| Realisation of objectives: | Platform self-governance has received relatively less public attention compared to public regulation. Our research makes an important contribution to this field. By studying the innovative schemes that Chinese online platforms have introduced to decentralize their governance, this research deepens our understanding of internal platform governance. It also offers practical insights to platform operators on improving their governance structures. The research outputs include two peer-reviewed papers published in Management Science, a leading business and management journal, and a book chapter in the principal investigator's new book, "High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy." They are as follows: Crowd-judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Ingroup Bias, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE ( forthcoming) Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (forthcoming) Chapter 7 Platforms As Quasi-Regulators, in "High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy" (OUP 2024) by Angela Huyue Zhang Chapter 8 Decentralizing Platform Governance: in "High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy" (OUP 2024) by Angela Huyue Zhang | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Summary of objectives addressed: |
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| Research Outcome | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Major findings and research outcome: | Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Ingroup Bias Disputes over transactions on two-sided platforms are typically resolved through customer service or third-party providers. This paper explores "crowd-judging," where users volunteer as jurors to resolve disputes on the Taobao e-commerce platform. The study focuses on in-group bias, where jurors favor their group (buyers or sellers). Sellers believe this bias undermines the legitimacy of crowd-judging due to the majority of jurors being buyers. Empirical findings show that seller jurors are 10% more likely to favor sellers, with bias more pronounced in close decisions and perceived threats to in-group interests. However, bias decreases with juror experience, reducing by nearly 95% as experience grows. Simulations reveal three insights: in-group bias affects less than 2% of cases under current policies, increasing crowd size is inefficient in reducing bias, and dynamic case allocation can mitigate bias and sustain a juror pool. Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail This study examines dispute resolution mechanisms for handling malicious reviews and blackmail on two-sided platforms. A game-theoretic model illustrates interactions between sellers and potentially malicious consumers, who may post negative reviews to demand ransom. Malicious consumers can significantly reduce seller profits, especially with high product quality uncertainty. A centralized dispute resolution mechanism, where platforms judge review disputes, can restore some efficiency but requires quick and accurate judgments. A decentralized mechanism, allowing sellers to remove reviews with potential penalties for wrongdoing, proves more effective and reduces the need for swift platform judgments. Properly implemented decentralization may thus offer a more efficient dispute resolution approach. Book Chapter: Decentralizing Platform Governance The chapter discusses how Chinese online platforms are decentralizing governance to address government intervention and market fraud concerns. It highlights innovative dispute resolution schemes by Taobao and other platforms, showing how crowd-sourcing mechanisms enhance efficiency and procedural justice in dispute resolution. This approach aims to diffuse tensions and improve platform governance. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Potential for further development of the research and the proposed course of action: |
With the advent of GPT-like services, it will be important and interesting to explore the role of artificial intelligence in resolving internal platform disputes, as well as the role of internal platform governance in resolving disputes in relation to the use of artificial intelligence. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Layman's Summary of Completion Report: | This research explores innovative mechanisms for dispute resolution and governance on Chinese e-commerce platforms like Taobao. By studying crowd-judging, where users volunteer as jurors to resolve disputes, the research reveals significant in-group bias, with seller jurors 10% more likely to favor sellers. This bias, however, diminishes by nearly 95% as jurors gain experience. Simulations suggest that while in-group bias affects less than 2% of cases, increasing juror numbers is inefficient, and dynamic case allocation can better reduce bias. Additionally, the research examines handling malicious reviews and blackmail, showing that fake negative reviews can harm profits. A centralized system for judging disputes requires quick and accurate decisions, but a decentralized approach, allowing sellers to remove reviews with penalties for misuse, proves more effective. Lastly, the research discusses how Chinese platforms are decentralizing governance to address government intervention and market fraud, using crowd-sourcing to enhance dispute resolution efficiency and procedural justice. Together, these studies highlight the potential of crowd-sourcing and decentralization in improving platform governance, provided they are implemented carefully to mitigate biases and enhance fairness. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Research Output | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Peer-reviewed journal publication(s) arising directly from this research project : (* denotes the corresponding author) |
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| Recognized international conference(s) in which paper(s) related to this research project was/were delivered : |
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| Other impact (e.g. award of patents or prizes, collaboration with other research institutions, technology transfer, etc.): |
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| SCREEN ID: SCRRM00542 |