Abstract as per original application
(English/Chinese): |
The proposed study will examine the impact of “revolving-door” judges in the Chinese judicial system. By compiling a comprehensive dataset of judges, lawyers, law firms, litigants, and lawsuits in China from 2014 to 2021, the principal investigator will investigate the judicial and economic implications of judges leaving their positions to practice law.
Preliminary research by the principal investigator has identified over 14,000 judges who have made this transition, constituting 6.6% of all judges and 2.6% of all lawyers nationwide. The proposed study will explore three key questions:
First, do revolving-door lawyers obtain more favorable court decisions for their clients in comparable lawsuits?
Second, if so, does this advantage stem from their legal expertise (“know how”) or personal connections (“know who”)?
Third, do revolving-door lawyers contribute to social inequality by using their connections and arguments to favor affluent clients, potentially biasing judicial decisions and exacerbating socioeconomic disparities?
The overall aim of this research is to provide comprehensive analysis of the revolving-door phenomenon in the Chinese judicial system, shedding light on the role of highly connected and skilled lawyers in shaping judicial, economic, and social outcomes.
本研究将考察中国司法系统中法律职业的影响。通过整理涵盖法官、律师、律师事务所、诉讼当事人以及案件的全面数据集，项目将研究法律职业（精英律师）所带来的司法和经济影响。
初步的研究已识别出超过14,000名法官离职后担任律师的情形，占全国所有法官的6.6%，以及所有律师的2.6%。研究将围绕三个关键问题展开：
第一，精英律师在类案中是否能为客户争取到更有利的判决？
第二，这种优势是否源于他们的法律专业知识（“know how”）或人脉关系（“know who”）？
第三，精英律师是否加剧社会不平等，影响司法公正，扩大社会经济差距？
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