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Project Details
Funding Scheme : General Research Fund
Project Number : 17622019
Project Title(English) : Court Curbing: Elites and Judicial Power in the Age of Populism  
Project Title(Chinese) : 司法遏制:民綷浪潮下的政治精英及司法權力 
Principal Investigator(English) : Dr Schwartz, Alexander David 
Principal Investigator(Chinese) :  
Department : Department of Law
Institution : The University of Hong Kong
Co - Investigator(s) :
Panel : Humanities, Social Sciences
Subject Area : Social and Behavioural Sciences
Exercise Year : 2019 / 20
Fund Approved : 685,320
Project Status : On-going
Completion Date : 31-8-2022
Abstract as per original application
(English/Chinese):
This research is about legislative and executive efforts to limit or control the power of courts, a phenomenon known as “court curbing”. The topic is both perennial and timely. Even in longstanding and stable constitutional democracies, courts may have their jurisdiction curtailed or their resources cut. In more extreme cases, the judges themselves may be impeached and replaced by more docile alternatives. Recent events in Poland and elsewhere have made questions of judicial independence and court curbing more pressing than ever. Although this latest wave of court curbing may appear to reflect a broadly “populist” hostility to judiciaries, I will show how court curbing is driven primarily by the interests of political elites and their frustration with independent courts. To this end, I use cross-national data to investigate how court curbing might be predicted in advance, testing hypotheses that court curbing will be prefigured by episodes of non-compliance with judicial decisions and proactive efforts by political elites to turn public opinion against the courts. I will also look closely at how anti-court discourse is employed to justify and legitimate court curbing in recent examples from Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Ultimately, these two lines of inquiry will come together to show how court curbing is motivated and shaped by elite interests.
此研究與「司法遏制」有關,意指立法及行政機關嘗試限制或控制法院的權力。此題目具迫切性及深遠影響。即使在歷史悠久及穩定的民主體制,法院仍會面對其管轄權被限制或資源被削減的風險。在更極端的情況下,法官更有機會被彈劾並被其他相對溫順的人選取締。近期於匈牙利、波蘭及土耳其的發展令司法獨立及司法遏制的問題變得更迫切。雖然近年的司法遏制浪潮似是民綷主義對司法機構呈現的敵意,我認為司法遏制是源於政治精英的利益及他們對於司法獨立的不滿。為此,我將利用跨國數據研究如何預測司法遏制及測試於司法遏制發生之前通常會先出現不遵守法院判決及政治精英積極將民意放於法院的對立面上的假設。另外,在波蘭、土耳其及英國的例子中的,我會研究「反法院」的論述如何被建立並合理化司法遏制。以上兩個研究問題將顯示司法遏制是如何被政治精英的利益推動及成形。
Research Outcome
Layman's Summary of
Completion Report:
Not yet submitted

  SCREEN ID: SCRRM00542